The article examines the theoretical and legal meaning of the concept of the term of office of judges of constitutional jurisdiction, as well as its influence on the institutional independence of the judiciary. The emphasis is on the fact that the term of office is not only a formal time limit, but an element of guaranteeing the independence of judges and preventing political pressure. Based on the reports of the Venice Commission, the advantage of fixed, non-renewable terms of office over lifelong or renewable mandates is substantiated.

In the comparative legal aspect, the experience of France, Germany, Poland and Ukraine is analyzed. The French model with a one-time mandate of 9 years and a rotation system every three years ensures a gradual change in the composition of the Constitutional Council and prevents the dominance of one political force. The German model provides for a 12-year term for judges of the Federal Constitutional Court without the possibility of re-election and with election by parliament on the basis of cross-party consensus. In Poland, the term of office of judges of the Constitutional Tribunal is also nine years without the right to reappointment, however, the centralized appointment procedure only through the Sejm raises risks of politicization, which was reflected in the constitutional crisis of 2015.In the context of Ukraine, the nine-year term of office of judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, provided for by the Constitution and a special Law, as well as the peculiarity of the system of appointment by three entities – the President, the Verkhovna Rada and the Congress of Judges, which can be considered as a potential guarantee of balance, is considered. At the same time, the lack of systematic rotation and lengthy procedures for selecting judges may affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of the body of constitutional jurisdiction.

It is concluded that a limited, single term of office with a ban on re-election is a priority for ensuring the independence of constitutional judges, provided that there is a proper and balanced appointment procedure.

Bibliography

Authored books

1. Kommers D P, Miller R A, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Third edition, Revised and Expanded, Duke UP 2012). Edited books

2. Magnon X, ‘La protection des juges constitutionnels’, in La protection des pouvoirs constitués. Chefs de l’Etat, Ministres, Parlementaires, Juges (Philippe SEGUR direction, Bruylant 2007) 167–189.

Journal articles

3. Colliard J-C, ‘Un nouveau Conseil Constitutionnel?’ [2011] 137(2) Pouvoir 162.

4. Espinosa R, ‘L’indépendance du Conseil constitutionnel français en question’ [2015] 4(4) Les Cahiers de la Justice 556.

5. Favoreu L, ‘La légitimité du juge constitutionnel’ [1994] 46-2 Revue internationale de droit comparé 573. Websites

6. Bada E, ‘Comment garantir l’independance du juge constitutionnel’ (Excellence Academie, 18 mars 2019) (accessed 13.04.2025).

7. Gardien P, ‘Le Conseil Constitutionnel ne s’occupe pas de politique’ (Le Village de la justice, 13 avril 2023) (accessed 13.04.2025).